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Abstract: Human language inevitably depicts the world from a human point of 
view. This article briefly reviews key positions on the use of anthropomorphic and 
anthropocentric language taken by scientists and discourse analysts. It then pres­
ents the data used in this investigation – a corpus of transcripts of the television 
series Life. The methods of analysis are explained, as is the focus adopted, which 
is less on the more obvious, lexical choices made by the presenter, David Atten­
borough, and more on the grammatical patterns which we suggest play a signifi­
cant role in the depiction of the wide range of species represented in the pro­
grams. Three grammatical features – pronouns, the connective so, and the to 
infinitive form – were explored in context, and the results demonstrate how, sep­
arately and together, they play a significant role in the representation in these 
texts of animals’ perspectives, connoting in subtle ways both intention and evalu­
ation. We suggest a need for greater dialogue between broadcasters, discourse 
analysts, and ethologists.
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1 Introduction
It is a truism that human language depicts the world from a human point of view. 
Extensive, longstanding, and growing concerns about the capacities of non­
human animals, and about our relationships with them, give rise to consider­
ations of how best to communicate about them, on the part both of those who 
study them professionally and those who re­present information about them to a non­
specialist public. In this article, we review discussions about anthropomorphism 
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and anthropocentrism among scientists and discourse analysts, before turning to 
the data used in this investigation – a corpus of transcripts of the television series 
Life. We then explain the methods of analysis used, which focus less on the more 
obvious, lexical choices made by the presenter, David Attenborough, and more 
on the grammatical patterns which we suggest play a significant role in the depic­
tion of the wide range of species represented in the programs.
2  Attitudes to anthropomorphic language in 
science writing
In the late nineteenth century, the notion of an absolute barrier between humans 
and other animals was threatened by the publication of Darwin’s theory of evolu­
tion. While it was gradually recognized that the physical makeup and sensory 
organs of other species may not be so different from those of humans, there was 
also caution about assuming too much similarity. It was around this time that the 
term “anthropomorphism” came to be extended from “ascription to angels and 
God of human qualities” to include the projection of the latter on to animals 
(Wynne 2007: 126). Wynne quotes George Herbert Lewes (from the Oxford English 
Dictionary 2006), writing on the “vision of mollusks (which, he believed, had 
only rudimentary sensitivity to light)”: 
“We speak with large latitude of anthropomorphism when we speak of the ‘vision’ of these 
animals. . . Molluscan vision is not human vision; nor in accurate language is it vision at 
all. . .” (1860, p. 359). He went on, “. . . we are incessantly at fault in our tendency to anthro­
pomorphise, a tendency which causes us to interpret the actions of animals according to the 
analogies of human nature” (1860, p. 385).
(Wynne 2007: 126)
In 1893, the comparative psychologist Charles Lloyd Morgan put forward his 
“basal canon,” which advocated assuming no “higher” faculties in animals than 
were warranted to explain their behavior. The context is identified by Kimler 
(2000: 854) as “irresolvable tensions – evolutionary continuity vs. the separate 
quality of human abstract reasoning; objective observation vs. subjective experi­
ence; blind selection vs. intentionality.” Morgan’s canon laid a foundation for the 
convention in scientific writing of avoiding attributing to animals characteristics 
for which there was no clear evidence: “we are logically bound not to assume the 
existence of . . . higher faculties” without such evidence (cited in Sober 2005: 91). 
In the early twentieth century, the role of empirical evidence became more 
prominent. Practitioners of the young discipline of psychology, who sought to 
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have it recognized as “a purely objective experimental branch of natural science” 
(Watson 1913: 158), proposed that both humans and animals should be investi­
gated in equivalent ways, but that this should be without reference to the unob­
servable inner workings of mind or consciousness. Some aspects of terminology 
were stipulated: “I believe we can write a psychology, . . . [which would] . . . never 
use the terms consciousness, mental states, mind, content, introspectively verifi­
able, imagery, and the like” (1913: 166). This behaviorist approach discouraged 
the use of terms which implied knowledge of animals’ (or people’s) thoughts or 
emotions, seeing descriptions “concerning immediate experience” and “attempts 
at direct intercommunications” as the province not of science but of “the arts and 
. . . metaphysics” (Tolman 1935: 356). 
By the middle of the last century, Tinbergen, credited with defining the field 
of ethology (Wynne 2007), was still drawing attention to the perils of subjective 
terminology, observing that though “one rarely meets with [subjectivism] in its 
crudest form (‘the animal attacks because it feels angry’), . . . in its subtler forms 
it is still very much with us” (1963: 413), and he was concerned that concepts such 
as “play” and “learning” had not been – and perhaps could not be – “purg[ed] . . . 
completely from their subjectivist, anthropomorphic undertones.” By 1967, the 
unacceptability of “any application of human­oriented language to the activities 
of other animals” was clearly being stated: “Anthropomorphic or teleological 
thinking has no place in a scientific study of animal behaviour” (Keeton 1967: 452, 
in Kennedy 1992: 1). Such proscriptions on the use of mentalistic descriptions of 
animals’ actions are summarized by Boakes (1992: 22, cited in Griffin 2001: 29): 
“Attributing conscious thought to animals should be strenuously avoided in any 
serious attempt to understand their behaviour, since it is untestable, empty [and 
obstructionist].” 
However, in more recent decades, there have been various reactions against 
proscriptions on anthropomorphic thinking and therefore on the use of anthro­
pomorphic terminology. These developments can be seen as of two broad types. 
One view permits anthropomorphic terminology, but it is understood that this is 
just a convenience, a metaphor, not to be taken literally. The second is ontologi­
cal, a more profound rejection of the rationale behind the proscription, from the 
position that “It is narrow minded to believe that we are the only species with 
minds or the only species that can think, make plans, and experience pain and 
pleasure” (Bekoff 2003: 55). 
Within the first perspective, there are those who tolerate the use of anthropo­
morphic language and others who actively endorse it, at least to a limited extent. 
Arguments for the former position include the lack of available alternative ways 
to describe animals and their behavior, and the necessity of communicating in 
simple terms to lay audiences (including television viewers). Less pragmatic 
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 reasons, according to Allen and Hauser (1991: 223), for making use of “mentalistic 
vocabulary or moderate anthropomorphism” include the potential of such re­
sources to provide a “heuristic role in hypothesis generation (Dennett 1983, and 
Asquith 1984) and this view has been endorsed by some researchers of animal 
behavior (e.g., Burghardt 1985).” 
Allen and Hauser (1991: 222–223) report that terms such as strategy, deceit, 
cheating, and rape are sometimes used “with explicit disavowals of the necessity 
to invoke any mental states underlying the behaviors described by these terms,” 
so that the “metaphorical use of terms such as ‘deceit’ is an accepted part of be­
havioral ecology which must be understood on its own terms.” On the other hand, 
they point out that “[o]ther researchers in both behavioral ecology and experi­
mental psychology have intended their use of mentalistic vocabulary much less 
metaphorically. This is particularly true of those whose research has focused on 
cognition in nonhuman primates.” The growth of cognitive ethology has led to an 
explicit engagement with “the subjective emotions, desires, beliefs, and behav­
ioral choices [of animals] intended to achieve certain results or avoid others” 
(Griffin 2001: 23). Cognitive ethologists – and others – now defend descriptions of 
animals that use terms associated with humans, although the debate about how 
acceptable this is continues; for a recent review, see Asquith (2011). 
To summarize: It has been established that human­like language for the de­
scription of animals is to some extent unavoidable; some commentators believe 
that a tendency toward anthropomorphism “is probably programmed into us 
 genetically as well as being inoculated culturally” (Kennedy 1992: 167). Once 
 explicitly proscribed and deemed unscientific, human­like terms for animals’ ac­
tions are now more widely accepted – though to different extents and for different 
 reasons – among those who research and report on animals and their behavior. 
We turn now to the more centrally linguistic literature.
3  Discourse analysis and anthropomorphic language
Space does not permit an extensive discussion of the relationships between 
 physical reality, sensory perception, and linguistic representation. Systemicists 
have noted that both “the world of our experience” and the way that the lexico­
grammar construes our experience are “highly indeterminate” (Halliday 2004: 
173), and, more specifically, analysts such as Davidse (1992: 132) explore in detail 
the gradient categories, including of degrees of animacy and agency, that encode 
such “shifting meanings.” Meanwhile, the way in which language “emerges 
 organically from the interaction of varied inherent and experiential factors” 
 (Langacker 1991: 1), giving rise to prototypical categories, has occupied cognitive 
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linguists, who also speculate about the degree to which human perception and 
animal perception overlap (e.g., Wierzbicka 1996, 2004). Langacker (1991: 307) 
proposes that “whether an entity is human, animate, physical, or abstract is a 
matter of its intrinsic character,” and that we are predisposed to empathize more 
with those entities with which we share “likeness and common concerns.” 
At the same time, a growing body of linguistic work has begun to consider 
explicitly the representation of animals in various genres, often from a perspec­
tive that is critical of their treatment at the hands of humans. Rather than being 
concerned with anthropomorphism, then, this research is largely about anthro­
pocentrism. Areas of investigation include: how animals killed for meat are rep­
resented discursively (Stibbe 2001, 2003; Dunayer 2003); how “nature” (in the 
form of both animals and inanimate phenomena) is represented as “an exploit­
able commodity” and “a territorial possession” (Goatly 2002: 25); Goatly (2006) 
and Keulartz and Van der Weele (2008) have explored the role of metaphor in 
discourse about animals, and Kemmerer (2006) coins the term “anymal” as a way 
of filling the lexical gap she perceives in the language for animals other than 
 humans.
Although some researchers consider grammatical patterns (see below), the 
main focus of this kind of study is usually lexical – considering the nouns, verbs, 
and adjectives which label different species and their actions and behavior. In 
this, the discourse analysts’ perspective tends to continue that of the animal sci­
entists. As Asquith (2011) notes:
Much of what has been written with regard to anthropomorphism by primatologists and 
ethologists is about vocabulary: whether, how or why particular terms or more generally 
intentional vocabulary are permissible when referring to animals. (Asquith 2011: 239) 
Within linguistics, an obvious exception is the contrastive work which identifies 
both lexical and grammatical differences across languages, including in the way 
humans, animals, and other entities are construed, where number systems, case 
markers, and so on, as well as items of vocabulary, display variation. (See, for 
example, Lucy [1992] on Yucatec Maya; Yamamoto [1999, 2006] on Japanese.) Our 
focus here, however, is on English, and specifically the language of the wildlife 
documentary.
4  The wildlife documentary genre
Among the many kinds of discourse where nonhuman animals are prominent, 
wildlife documentaries are “a prism through which we can examine investments 
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in dominant ideologies of humanity and animality” (Chris 2006: xiv), so that they 
are potentially influential on how animals are perceived, discussed, and thought 
about (Dingwall and Aldridge [2006: 147], though see Bousé [2000: xiv] for a more 
cautionary take on the influential aspects of wildlife documentaries), and are for 
most people their chief (or in some cases, only) source of “contact” with foreign 
and exotic animals (Jacobs and Stibbe 2006: 1). As Chris (2006) points out, they 
both define and refine the concept of animality, and are thus particularly fruitful 
for exploring patterns in discourse where animals are the main topic. Implicated 
in the potential anthropomorphism of all such documentaries are not only the 
words used, but also the images, film techniques (such as time­lapse photogra­
phy, composition of shots and camera angles, digital manipulation of images), 
and accompanying music (e.g., Bousé 2003; Elliot 2001; Horak 2006; King 1996). 
While it is acknowledged that these are all integral to these texts as a whole, the 
focus in this analysis is specifically on choices within the language itself, so these 
other aspects, while we recognize that they may influence audience perceptions, 
can only be touched on here. 
Within this genre, the contribution of the internationally celebrated natural 
history presenter, David Attenborough, is hard to overestimate. The programs 
with which he has been associated are frequently cited as some of the most re­
spected and representative of the wildlife documentary genre (Chris 2006: xii), 
and the present study uses those in the BBC television series Life. This prize­ 
winning series was first broadcast on the BBC in 2009, and subsequently by  media 
companies across the world. 
Attenborough’s style of commentary has received some criticism for its an­
thropomorphizing, a charge of which he is well aware (Attenborough 1982; Elliot 
2001: 289; King 1996; Léon 2005), but, like all wildlife television presenters (see 
Siegel 2005), he has to manage competing demands; on the one hand, he is re­
quired to create and maintain audience interest, and on the other, he has to be 
aware of misrepresenting species by over­drawing the parallels with human be­
ings. In a critical review of a book about the language of animal studies, Boakes 
(2001: 397) highlights a contrast between the language of popularizing presenters 
in wildlife television programs and that used for reporting research in academic 
journals. The former, he says, “use language that is entirely unrestrained in its 
attribution of human­like mental states to the nonhuman stars,” whereas aca­
demic research is described (and there is, he maintains, “no puzzle here”) in “an 
entirely different language, one that attempts to eliminate anthropomorphic 
terms.” However, as we have seen, the issue is not quite as simple as this. Not only 
is there not a consensus about how undesirable anthropomorphic language  really 
is, any commentator is also constrained by various features of language itself. 
Kennedy (1992: 158) argues for terminology that is “free of teleological, anthropo­
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morphic overtones” – and in this he is at odds with some cognitive ethologists. 
Even from this position, though, he recognizes that attempts to abide by such a 
goal are “usually clumsy and prolix because they are inevitably strained com­
pared with our everyday speech.” Furthermore, he argues, these inherent con­
straints lead to less “innocent” outcomes than is the case with many other meta­
phors and analogies, because “anthropomorphic analogies for animal behaviour 
. . . readily generate misunderstanding” (1992: 159). Kennedy is concerned here 
with what he calls “unconscious” or “unwitting” anthropomorphism, a result of 
“our in­built tendency to think of animal behaviour subjectively as we think of 
our own” (1992: 35), which can mean that “[i]t is often hard to tell whether an 
author’s anthropomorphic language is of the mock or the genuine variety, or 
 unthinkingly ambiguous” (1992: 90).
5  Between lexis and grammar
We argue elsewhere (Sealey and Oakley 2013) that the Life programs differentiate 
among various kinds of creatures in the degree to which they are depicted as 
 acting from desire and intention. Where this implication is carried by the choice 
of vocabulary, viewers are likely to notice the quite obvious, and probably inten­
tionally humorous, examples of anthropomorphism. The musical and visual 
channels may emphasize this. For instance, in one sequence, from the episode 
Creatures of the Deep, a male cuttlefish mates with a (smaller) female, after which 
a second male cuttlefish comes into view, and we are told that, being small, “he” 
is not likely to be able to mate without being attacked by other males. But the film 
shows the small male changing color, thus now resembling a female, and edging 
closer to the larger male. Next, the image becomes a close­up of one of the larger 
male’s eyes (which appears to be scrutinizing something – a second “female”?), 
followed by a downward angle shot of the “disguised” smaller male swimming 
around in front of the larger male, to the accompaniment of a light, jovial tune. 
The commentary here includes a series of vocabulary choices which connote a 
human perspective and cultural values, especially about sexual fidelity: 
masters of deception; sneaky; disguise; he thinks his luck is in; another female to add to his 
conquests; sly, cross-dressing; holding his nerve; the sneak; she isn’t choosy; surreptitiously 
mates with him right under the larger male’s tentacles; masterful males; little sneaks; she’ll 
have all the bases covered.
The visual, musical, and lexical channels mutually reinforce this knowingly 
 anthropomorphic sequence. However, presenters are more constrained by, and 
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viewers less likely to be aware of, the nature of those linguistic resources which 
fall nearer to the grammatical end of the lexical­grammatical system. 
In each case, we start from a grammatical feature, but from a perspective 
which recognizes that the phenomenon we are interested in, namely the implied 
attribution of human­like capacities and behavior to nonhuman creatures, arises 
from interactions between lexis and grammar (e.g., Halliday 2004; Hunston and 
Francis 2000). Our approach thus illustrates something that has been demon­
strated extensively by corpus analysis, which is that “the boundary between con­
tent and function words is fuzzy” (Stubbs 2004: 118). All the items we have se­
lected for closer investigation are frequent words, and these, says Stubbs (2004: 
118), “are frequent because they occur in frequent phrases. In these phrases, fre­
quent words are often delexicalized, because meaning is dispersed across the 
whole phrase.” For these reasons, our attention falls on that area “around the 
middle” of the grammar–lexis continuum, described by Halliday (2004: 45) as 
“rather large and fuzzy closed systems or . . . somewhat determinate and limited 
open sets.” 
Somewhere at the intersection between the lexical process of naming (in this 
case, creatures) and the grammatical resources that link lexical items into propo­
sitions is the pronoun system. Like some previous researchers, we noted the re­
currence of switches between gendered and neuter pronouns in some of the epi­
sodes, and this was chosen as one focus for further analysis. Studies of the 
frequency and discoursal effects of pronoun choice include that by Gupta (2006: 
107), who sees the selection of who rather than which as a marker of “a high level 
of sentience in a nonhuman animal,” finding in her corpus analysis that who is 
typically used with “primates, and animals commonly used as companion ani­
mals,” while “animals commonly used as food are more likely to be followed by 
which” (2006: 114). An analysis of the British National Corpus (Gilquin and Jacobs 
2006) revealed various patterns in which the relative pronoun who may be used 
for a nonhuman animal, concluding that its use does not necessarily imply a 
 positive representation. Use of the gendered pronouns usually confers greater 
 individuality on to living creatures than the neuter it, and commentators have 
observed how such language choices in wildlife documentaries may invoke ideo­
logical aspects of human gender roles and sexuality (Chris 2006; Crowther 1999; 
Crowther and Leith 1995). Less extensively discussed in this context is generic 
you, although Myers and Lampropoulou (2012) report a wide range of uses for this 
apparently straightforward item in the genre of research interviews. Within the 
telling of narratives, according to Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990: 739), shifts to im­
personal you tend to have a semantic–pragmatic function, occurring in the kind 
of “life drama episode that is potentially applicable to anyone at all” (1990: 750), 
“somewhat like ‘Everyman’ in a medieval morality play” (1990: 752). In this study, 
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as well as looking at gender pronouns and the who/which choices, we explore the 
use of you as a means of establishing empathy between commentator, audience, 
and the animals represented.
Close contact with the data also drew our attention to the way in which con­
nections between sequences of behavior are often implied, though not stated ex­
plicitly, by the use of the connective so. Clauses with so “may be either resultative 
or purposive” (Toolan 1990: 242), and it is not always possible to determine which 
is intended. Similarly, “purposive clauses are often infinitival” (1990: 242; see also 
Schulte 2007: 512; Egan 2008), and it can be even more difficult to interpret events 
as either “consciously intended or arbitrary” (Toolan 1990: 242). We explored how 
purpose and intention are construed in our corpus by so (that) constructions, and 
by to infinitives.
Our study, then, explores in greater detail these features of the data. We aim 
to illuminate how they serve to “animate” the creatures depicted, and how they 
help the presenter to deal with the unresolved (and probably unresolvable) ques­
tion of the extent to which the creatures’ actions are prompted by thoughts, feel­
ings, or intentions. In the next section, we describe the data in a little more detail, 
and then present the analytical methods we used to identify and explore these 
linguistic patterns.
6 Data and method
As mentioned above, the data comprises transcriptions of the spoken commen­
tary to all ten of the 50­minute long episodes of the series Life, a total of just under 
30,000 words. After the first, introductory episode, “Challenges of Life” (hence­
forth abbreviated to (Ch)), each of the others focuses on a different theme: 
 “Reptiles and Amphibians” (Re), “Mammals” (Ma), “Fish” (Fi), “Birds” (Bi), 
 “Insects” (In), “Hunters and Hunted” (Hu), “Creatures of the Deep” (Cr), “Plants” 
(Pl), and  “Primates” (Pr). Although two of these (Ch) and (Hu) survey creatures 
of different kinds, the organization of the other episodes means that there is at 
least a loose correspondence between the episode and the kinds of species fore­
grounded in it. Once transcribed, the texts were converted to text­only format and 
collated into a digital corpus. The program WordSmith Tools (Scott 2008) was 
used for calculating the frequencies of individual items, for concordance  analysis. 
The pronouns investigated were: he, him, himself, she, her (as pronoun, not 
determiner), herself, you, your, yourself, who, and which. As the plural forms of 
both gendered and neuter pronouns, they and them were not included. With its 
high frequency with a wide range of referents beyond living things, it poses par­
ticular problems for analysis. A combination of the “local grammar” tool TextTool 
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(Mason 2012) and a sampling procedure facilitated the identification of some pat­
terns in the use of it in this corpus. While basic quantifications generated some 
interesting results, we also found it necessary to look closely at the co­text of the 
target items. That is, we wanted to know not only which creatures warrant pro­
nominal s/he rather than it, but also what kinds of things “she,” “he,” and “it” are 
reported as doing. Our analysis thus moves outward from the pronouns where it 
begins and includes the verbs of which these items are the subjects. 
Since concordance programs alone are not readily able to discriminate be­
tween the many uses of either connective so or infinitive to, to analyze these we 
used the tagger QTag (Mason 2011) and TextTool (Mason 2012). These helped to 
isolate occurrences in the corpus of these items in the constructions of interest, 
removing, for example, to as preposition and so as intensifier, and highlighting 
the patterns “so [NP] + [VB] [+. . .],” such as “so he [mudskipper] digs himself a 
tunnel down into the mud”, (Fi). Again, these instances were further explored to 
identify the patterns in which they occur. 
The final stage of analysis was to review the various patterns – pronominal 
reference and implied intention (with so and to) – to see how they may cumula­




Overall, quantitative results for the gendered pronouns are summarized below, 
although it should be noted that these to some extent reflect the distribution of 
types of species represented across the ten episodes. Nevertheless, there is a clear 
pattern which suggests a fairly predictable “cline” from the most animate mam­
mals (including primates) to the least animate species, depicted in “Plants” (see 
Figure 1). 
With so many instances of he (111) and she (215), some had to be filtered out. 
In order to explore, initially, the kinds of things that creatures personified with 
gendered pronouns are depicted as doing, we focused on clauses with positive 
polarity and no modality. So we excluded from this data subset instances of the 
following kinds: passives, where the pronominal subject is not the agent of the 
verb; negative constructions, since these report what the creature does not do 
(e.g., “Even if he [hippo] wants to he can’t stay much longer”, (Ch); “she [beetle] 
doesn’t seem to be in the mood”, (In)); modal and conditional constructions, 
 including needs to and has to, since these often denote what the creature may – 
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but also may not – do (e.g., “Over the next two weeks, she [frog] can climb almost 
half a mile tending her young”, (Ch); “With luck, she [cuttlefish] will now have a 
mix of offspring”, (Cr); “if she [tiger] moves now”, (Hu)). This excluded set con­
tains material well worth further analysis, but we focus on the remaining data. 
We classified these remaining clauses, where he, she, and who are the sub­
jects, with reference to the actions denoted by the verbs. The creatures featured in 
these programs are typically, and presumably uncontentiously, depicted as doing 
the kinds of things which any observer of animal behavior would expect them to 
do: moving, eating, killing prey, and so on, and so we did not focus on these 
clauses further. Examples are: “He hunts ants”, (In); “She lays an unfertilized 
egg”, (Ch); “with her calf, she slowly moves towards it”, (Ch). Likewise, relational 
clauses with link verbs denote neither animacy nor intention (e.g., “After her 
long and lonely vigil she [octopus] is dead”, (Fi); “It seems he [lammergeier]’s 
too  late”, (Bi)). This filtering process left a remainder of 5 clauses with who, 17 
with he, and 28 with she, in which there is more evidence of the kind of process 
which Halliday (2004: 260) identifies as “mental,” where the active participant 
is a “senser” engaged in a process of “perception,” “cognition,” “desideration,” 
or “emotion.” 
The patterns which emerge from these 50 clauses are summarized here. Re­
sults for who are included with those for he and she. These 50 clauses contain 
single instances of the following verbs: care, dare, decide, encourage, exploit, 
find, focus, fool, give, guard, inspect, intrude, let, make, oblige, offer, 
Fig. 1: Raw figures for pronouns by broad category of creature
Brought to you by | Lancaster University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/13/14 3:52 PM
410   Alison Sealey and Lee Oakley
outwit, pass on, risk, sacrifice, search, set, struggle, tend, think, time, 
vet, want, win, and work. Some of these verbs invite comment. Give, for exam­
ple, in its “core” sense, may seem not to belong in this subset, as creatures may 
readily be reported as “giving” such things as food to their young, with no anthro­
pomorphic implications. In context, however, the abstract concept denoted by 
the object in this clause “the best chance she can” surely does encourage us to see 
the octopus as capable of evaluating options and taking decisions. Similarly set 
can have a material sense (if a creature “sets” its catch on the ground, say), but 
this instance was “Here she [whale] sets her ambush, waiting for the seal to 
stray”, where, again, the planning is implied as much by the object (“her 
 ambush”, including a gendered possessive) as by the verb.
The creatures which feature as the subjects of these clauses are diverse: 
 baboon, bower bird, capuchin monkey, chameleon, cheetah, chimpanzee, clown­
fish, cuttlefish, damselfly, frog, garter snake, grebe, horned lizard, hummingbird, 
hyena, lammergeier, macaque, meerkat, mudskipper, octopus, penguin, polar 
bear, sea krait (snake), seal, sengi, stalk­eyed fly, whale. Some “sensory” verbs 
occur more than once in this subset of the data: know, learn, look, sense, and 
watch all occur twice; while take occurs three times, in the following contexts: 
“she takes great care of” (octopus), “she’s taking a risk” (polar bear), and “she 
takes risks” (hyena). The most frequent verb in this subset is have, in its delexi­
calized sense, where the creature is not the subject of an explicitly human­like 
process, because the connotations of mental and emotional involvement come 
from the sequence of which have is the “empty” verb. These eight examples are 
reproduced in full in Table 1.
It was found that, where which refers to creatures in this data, it is in their generic 
capacity (“those animals which have young”; “the mammal which dominates 
this landscape”), or where the creature in question is being depicted as prey from 
Table 1: Mental process clauses with have where he, she, or who is the subject
Creature Clause/sentence Episode
whale Yet she has a plan (Hu)
damselfly But now, she has the problem of laying her fertilised eggs (In)
sea krait (snake) But now she has a problem (Re)
sea krait (snake) she has an extraordinary solution (Re)
stalk-eyed fly He now has the right to mate with all the females nearby (Ch)
cuttlefish he has another plan and it’s sneaky (Cr)
cuttlefish in the end he has no choice but to fight (Cr)
cuttlefish he’s got a problem (Cr)
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the perspective of a predator (“they hunt deer, which they ambush”; “the victim, 
a fly, which finds the color and nectar irresistible”). Thus, which has the expected 
function, compared with who, of distancing the audience from the creature to 
which it refers (though cf. Gupta [2006: 119], who notes that, when humans talk 
about hunting, “personalizing an animal does not preclude hunting [it] and is not 
necessary for its defence”). It, as explained above, can have a very wide range of 
referents. However, it seems reasonable to assume an even distribution across all 
the episodes of “false hits” (in constructions such as “it’s the dry season”; it refer­
ring to entities such as inanimate objects in the environment, “he drops it”). 
Any  differences in the raw frequencies found in each episode should then be 
 accounted for by the choice of gendered or neuter pronouns to refer to living 
things. And indeed it was found that it occurred most often in the program on 
plants, and nearly as often in “Reptiles and Amphibians,” with “Birds,” 
 “Primates,” and “Mammals” having the fewest instances (see Figure 2).
Like which, it is also chosen for generic reference, as in “Our planet may be home 
to 30 million different kinds of animals and plants, each individual locked in its 
own lifelong fight for survival”. Where the sex of a creature cannot be determined, 
it may be unavoidable, and this is more often the case with insects, fish, and 
 reptiles than with birds and mammals. Examples include:
Fig. 2: Raw figures for IT by episode
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(1) It [chameleon] creeps towards its victim until just in range (Ch)
(2) Its [jelly fish] weapons are harpoon­like cells that cover its tentacles (Cr)
(3) As it feeds, the shrimp gets protection and a free ride. (Cr)
The verbs of which it is the subject are more restricted than those found with he 
and she, and tend to denote moving, eating, attacking others, or defending one­
self. There is one instance of “it decides”, in a passage where the main perspec­
tive is that of a mammal, a squirrel, whose behavior when threatened “intimi­
dates the snake”:
(4) It [the snake] decides to retreat. The mother decides that this part of the neigh­
borhood is too dangerous and moves her young to new quarters. With luck, 
this may be a safer place to raise a family. (Hu)
One interpretation here is that it is the squirrel who perceives the predatory snake 
as “deciding” to retreat, as the mini­narrative encourages the audience to empa­
thize with the squirrel’s situation.
Another oblique means of aligning human and animal perspectives is 
through the use of the second­person pronouns, which, according to Kitagawa 
and Lehrer (1990: 752), can have the effect of “letting the hearer into the speaker’s 
world view, implying that the hearer also shares the same perspective.” In this 
corpus, there are 32 occurrences of you, yourself, and your combined, of which 
just 7 denote “you, the viewer” or “you” as human “one.” Examples of these in­
clude “This is the last place you might expect to find marine life”; “Everywhere 
you look, there are extraordinary examples”. The remainder have the pragmatic 
effect of inviting the audience to identify with a creature, or species, and its con­
text. It is in these constructions that another subtle linguistic means of bridging 
the gap between human observer (narrator and audience) and nonhuman ob­
served is deployed. Again, the processes in which the creatures are engaged 
are often presented as matters of choice, obligation, or judgment, while avoiding 
any explicit claim to know how the creature perceives its world. Occurrences tend 
to cluster together within passages of text, to maintain grammatical cohesion. 
 Examples include:
(5) The trouble is that exposing yourself inevitably makes you easily seen 
 (lizard; (Re))
(6) If you rely on the tides to expose your food, you have to work to fairly tight 
schedules . . . (baboon; (Pr))
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(7) Timing is an essential skill if you’re to harvest all the food that becomes 
available at one time or another around a coast (baboon; (Pr))
(8) You should never run from what you can’t see. You might just run straight 
into danger (deer; (Hu))
(9) The technique is to reach over your opponent’s head and hook your jaws 
under his wing cover (beetle; (In))
(10) Looking after your eggs is an even greater challenge (snake; (Re))
(11) It’s easier to steal than find fruit for yourself (red bug; (In))
(12) Having the widest eye span puts you at the top of the pecking order (fly; (Ch))
In summary, we suggest that the grammatical category of pronouns has a part to 
play in the “humanizing” of creatures in these texts. This occurs where the choice 
of gendered pronoun encourages an individualized, active, and “socially” con­
textualized portrayal of a creature. The effect is intensified by the interaction of 
the pronouns with verbs denoting evaluations, choices, and plans. Where the 
gendered creature is the subject of a delexicalized verb, such as take or have, the 
human­like processes of managing risks, problems, choices, and plans can be 
invoked more indirectly, as they can be by the use of second­person pronouns 
(and the determiner your), which also encourage a cognitive and affective identi­
fication by the audience with the creature in focus.
7.2 The role of so and to
In the analyses reported above, negative constructions were excluded, but it 
could be argued that such choices have a part to play in constructing a linguistic 
“picture” of these creatures and their potential. When we hear what a creature 
“doesn’t” do, then possibilities are invoked, even if these remain unrealized (see 
Sealey and Oakley 2013). For example:
(13) This 11­year­old female has an anvil but can’t find a hammer (Pr)
(14) The mother doesn’t know that her hungry young are now leaving their nest 
in search of a better provider (In)
Such statements seem to come from a stance somewhere between that of the hu­
man observer and the nonhuman observed creature. While not explicitly attribut­
ing intention or understanding to the creatures, neither do they rule these out. 
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A similar illocutionary force applies to the use of so. It functions to connect 
two items, often in one of the many mini­narratives found in these texts. Typi­
cally, there is a circumstance or event (I) followed by an action on the part of a 
creature (II); in such cases, so may suggest a purposive response while not explic­
itly crediting the creature with the capacity of decision making. There is a very 
subtle shading of meaning in these instances, where, at one extreme, (II) is an 
almost inevitable outcome of (I). For example:
(15) [Flowers are rare in this desert] (I), so [colonies of those bees are few and far 
between] (II). (In)
(16) [It rains almost every day] (I), so [this six­year­old has already had plenty of 
practice] (II). (Pr)
In these examples, (II) is consequent on (I) and so merely acts as a descriptive 
link. Other examples are more ambiguous, however, and active intention on the 
part of the creature, while not explicitly encoded, seems to be more clearly 
 implied:
(17) They could never find it by themselves, so their mother collects it for them 
(In)
(18) This is her first and only brood and so she takes great care of them (Ch)
(19) This new one [young meerkat] is a beginner, so he [adult meerkat] starts 
with something easy, how to dig for insect larvae (Ma)
(20) Now the fish find that they are under attack, and so group together for safety 
(Cr)
Processes occur in a sequence; linked by so, the suggestion of intentions and 
choices may inflect the narrative, and this applies as well to infinitives. There is a 
wide range of constructions that include to + infinitive, and we do not deal here 
with [be going + to + inf], used routinely to denote the future, nor with chained 
verbs, such as [start + to + inf], where the role of the infinitive in the sequence is 
primarily temporal. 
In the following examples, the infinitive clause is somewhat loosely connect­
ed to the preceding one. Labels for the surface structure would be [clause + to + inf] 
and [to + inf {+ other elements} + clause]. Such structures can convey choice and 
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intention quite forcefully, while avoiding crossing over into more explicit anthro­
pomorphism. They include:
(21) He [capuchin] taps them to see if they’re ready. (Ch)
(22) the squid flash red and white not only to confuse their prey, but also to signal 
to each other when they are about to attack (Cr)
(23) To complete his disguise he changes color to appear even more like a female 
(Cr)
(24) This is the only time she [octopus] will reproduce and to give her young their 
best chance, she sacrifices her life. (Cr)
(25) Plants must have light in order to grow and will do anything to get as much 
as they need. (Pl)
And in a sentence such as the following, both [be + to + inf] and [clause + to + inf] 
are combined, implying, though not stating explicitly, both an affective state and 
a purposive action:
(26) Her last act of devotion is to blow water over the eggs to help them hatch 
(Ch)
As can be seen, then, it is not only the more “advanced” species which can be 
represented as animate – and even intentional – through the deployment of this 
linguistic resource. 
Often, as here, the audience is “introduced” to an individual representative of 
its kind, one which becomes the protagonist in a narrative about survival – 
searching for food or water, avoiding predators or rivals, securing a mate, giving 
birth, rearing offspring. Within such sequences, the protagonist may be described 
using several of the linguistic strategies identified by our analysis. Even a rela­
tively “primitive” creature, such as a Japanese red bug, can be depicted using 
several of the strategies we have identified, as shown in Figure 3. 
8 Conclusion
As noted above, there is a growing body of work which draws attention to the 
way that language, not only lexically but also grammatically, both enables and 
constrains communication about animal behavior. Rich as it is in synonyms, the 
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English language offers the wildlife broadcaster a wide range of options as s/he 
uses commentary to mediate between the television viewer and denizens of “the 
natural world.” It is well established that these choices cannot be neutral, and 
that they will inevitably carry cultural and even ideological connotations. 
An anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this article asks “Can dis­
course analysis tell us how animals should be represented?” We don’t claim to 
answer such a far­reaching query here, proposing rather that discourse analysts, 
broadcasters, ethologists, and audiences need to debate such questions and ne­
gotiate the answers. However, discourse analysis, which has revealed presuppo­
sitions and assumptions about so many aspects of the social world, can at least 
expose the difficulties associated with representing perspectives on experience 
other than those with which we, as human beings, are endowed. The problem in 
describing creatures’ behavior may be less anthropomorphism – as we are pulled 
toward encoding the behavior of fish, birds, insects, and even plants as though 
what they are doing is what we would do, to be described in largely the same 
terms – and more the limitations of anthropocentrism. “If a lion could speak, 
we could not understand him,” says Wittgenstein (1958: 223), and we probably 
cannot hope to know what kinds of motivation, perception, and intention are as­
sociated with the observable behavior of the creatures featured in Life. Not only 
the lexical, but also the grammatical resources available to us inevitably construe 
They could never find it by themselves, so their mother collects it for them.
She probes every fruit she finds to test its ripeness, and rejects one after another.
This can take hours. At last, a perfect fruit. A thief  !
It’s easier to steal than find fruit for yourself.
For both bugs, the outcome of this dispute will be life-changing.
As the mother struggles to keep her prize, her young, back in the nest, are growing restless.
The thief  has won.
The mother doesn’t know that her hungry young are now leaving their nest in search of a 
 better provider.
She returns to find that her nest is empty.
Fig. 3: Marked-up passage from Insects highlighting examples of the various features 
presented in our analysis; single underline: gendered/2nd-person pronouns or determiners; 
double underline: so connective; broken underline: to + inf.; wavy underline: modals, 
negatives, conditionals; italics: other lexical choices denoting a human-like perspective
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our experience in particular ways, and these derive from our own means of know­
ing and experiencing the world, which is from a human perspective.
Never theless, an engagement with the issues we raise here obliges us to focus 
on the “lens” of linguistic construal, thus drawing attention to the “empathy 
 hierarchy” (Langacker 1991) from which we habitually perceive the world and our 
fellow creatures. Recognizing – and even exploring ways of overcoming – the 
limitations of our human perceptions is surely a goal worth pursuing. Yet, if there 
is a mismatch between what these creatures experience and how we describe it, 
perhaps this is because ultimately language itself cannot be disconnected from 
the species responsible for it – us.
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